United States Supreme Courts\u27 Impact: Broadening Our Focus by Wasby, Stephen L.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 5 Article 6
6-1-1974
United States Supreme Courts' Impact: Broadening
Our Focus
Stephen L. Wasby
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen L. Wasby, United States Supreme Courts' Impact: Broadening Our Focus, 49 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1023 (1974).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol49/iss5/6




Initial studies of the Supreme Court's impact developed along with a shift
from a traditional concentration on the Court's doctrinal output toward a per-
spective which accepted it as another political institution. The early studies of
the outcome of cases, narrowly descriptive and narrative, were concentrated on
civil liberties and civil rights matters, initially school desegregation, followed by
church-state relations,' obscene literature, internal security, reapportionment, and
criminal procedure. In the latter, Mapp v. Ohio2 and Miranda v. Arizonas
received the most attention, particularly in terms of police reaction4 and the com-
munication of decisions,5 along with the Gault6 ruling on juvenile rights, provid-
ing evidence of rural-urban differences in factors affecting compliance.
Civil liberties decisions are still the subject of most impact studies, and analysts
have tended to concentrate on their effect in a single arena (the courts or the
legislature or the community) . Church-state topics have continued to provide the
most important studies, including those with the greatest theoretical sophistica-
tion, utilizing communication and attitude change frameworks.8 There has been
only a limited change in the unavailability of studies in the economic regulation
area,9 and we still find serious gaps concerning the effect of decisions on the
executive branch."
While efforts have now been made to pull together the various relatively
* I wish to express my thanks to my colleagues at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
where I "visited" during 1972-1973, for the opportunity to present portions of some of this
material on several occasions, and to Carol Welch for a number of clarifying revisions. An
earlier version of this article was presented at the Ninth Congress of the International Political
Science Association, Montreal, Canada, August 24, 1973.
** Stephen Wasby is a Professor of Political Science at Southern Illinois University.
1 The first political science impact articles came from this field. Patrlic, The Impact of a
Court Decision: Aftermath of the McCollum Case, 6 J. PUB. L. 455 (1957); Sorauf, Zorach v.
Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 AM. POL. SCI. Rxv. 777 (1959).
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt
to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (1968); Wald et al., Interrogations in New
Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YA.E L.J. 1519 (1967).
5 N. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAw ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA
(1971).
6 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault
and Its Implementation, 3 L. & Soc'Y R. 491 (1969); Canon and Kolson, Rural Coripliance
with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study, 10 J. FAMILY L. 300 (1971).
7 For a model for studies of multiple arenas, see A. Sager, "The Impact of Supreme Court
Loyalty Oath Decisions," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Sep-
tember, 1971.
8 R. JoHNsoN, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE (1967); W. Mum, PRAYER IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE '(1967). See also K. DoLBEARE & P. HAM-
MoND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE (1971).
9 The principal works remain A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITAL-
isM (1968) and M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADmINISTRATrIE AGENCIES (1968).
10 R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY (1971), is an important
addition; see also M. SHAPIRO, supra note 9.
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isolated studies"l and while problems of conceptualization have been given some
attention, two 1970 issues of Law & Society Review devoted entirely to com-
pliance and related processes now provide a new storehouse of materials and a
critical starting point for anyone conducting impact research. 2 Because of this
developing body of theoretical and methodological material, an increasing
number of Supreme Court impact studies are no longer merely descriptive ac-
counts but are undertaken with at least some attention to systematic exploration
of factors producing compliance and affecting impact.
Among the variables consistently noted as relevant to a decision's impact
are the Court's case-by-case approach to a topic; such characteristics of a case
as the unanimity of the vote or the ambiguity of the opinion; the geographical
scope of a decision; the process by which the decision and opinion are com-
municated; follow-up to a decision by government officials; the situation-
political, economic, and social-into which a decision is injected; the position and
relative power of those who respond to the decision; characteristics of affected
communities; and the knowledge levels and belief systems--attitudes, orientation,
expectations, role conceptions-of those receiving the Court's decisions. Com-
munity elites' ability to withstand conflict or their desire to avoid it and lawyers'
consensus on what a case means or on whether or not to comply with it have
been noted more recently. So have a set of variables relating to organizational
demands and constraints; included are the subordinate employee's "work situa-
tion"1 and work location, e.g., the discretionary authoriy of the beat patrolman.
Two other variables are "occupational ideology," and a unit's reward structure,
which often reinforces noncompliance rather than compliance with Supreme
Court rulings. A unit's size and physical location in relation to other units are
important in terms of whether or not information about what the Court has
done will be received; small units cannot spare a person to monitor outside com-
munications on a full-time basis, but if the unit is near others, it can share in-
formation they receive.
In addition to this identification of relevant variables, there have also been
some new efforts at theory development such as Baum's view of the Court as an
organizational superior dealing with its subordinates, 4 although in only a few
studies have theoretically-derived hypotheses been consistently applied to new
data and theory-building has remained limited. Some theory has been developed
from previous studies including discussions of causes of compliance with law in
general and social change resulting from the Supreme Court's rulings.'5 Further-
11 THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES (2nd ed. T. Becker
and M. Feeley eds. 1973); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970).
12 Now published as COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW: A MULTI-DIscIPLINARY APPROACH
(Krislov et al., eds. 1972).
13 Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 467 (1971), and J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRrAL (1966).
14 L. Baum, "An Organizational Theory of Judicial Impact," paper presented to the
Midwest Political Science Association, May, 1973.
15 Respectively, Nagel, Causes and Effects of Constitutional Compliance, POLITICAL AND
LEGA. OBLIGATION: NoMos xn 219 (J. Pennock and Chapman eds. 1970), and Grossman,
The Supreme Court and Social Change, 13 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 535 '(1970). See also
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (J. Grossman and M. Grossman eds. 1971).
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more, as a result of drawing on social science theory and greater inter-disciplinary
attention to law-society relationships, impact studies have become much less
isolated from political science and the remainder of social science and can
be more closely related to other studies of law and social change.Y
II. Toward Comparative Impact Studies
With few exceptions impact studies have been limited to the United States,
if not solely to the United States Supreme Court. As we build from single-
country studies toward a general theory of the political impact of constitutional
courts, we must identify central aspects of the American judicial system which
would affect and limit the comparability of American findings if those studies
are to be utilized in comparative work1  We might do this in terms of several
questions which should be pursued as part of such a comparative study
One question is whether the power of judicial review exists, and if so, where
it is located. While we used to say that judicial review differentiated the United
States Supreme Court-and the American judicial system-from the high courts
and judicial systems of other countries, many other nations now possess some form
of judicial review, although the structural variations are numerous. What is
significant about American judicial review is that the power is present in all
of the nation's courts even though some lower court judges may not consider
it appropriate to exercise such power. Our federal system, with separate con-
stitutions for national and state governments, reinforces this decentralization of
judicial review. In addition our courts carry out their constitutional functions
along with their other work further differentiating them from the constitutional
courts of other nations. Even the Supreme Court is not solely a constitutional
court, and only a small part of its workload, even during the Warren Court, has
been devoted to constitutional interpretation.
The decentralization of judicial review complicates the problem of impact
in two ways. The lower courts expected to carry out the Supreme Court's rulings
may, through their independent authority for judicial review, reinterpret what
the federal high court has done. Furthermore, these lower courts, by deciding
issues in advance of Supreme Court rulings, leave far less than a blank slate on
which the Supreme Court can write, thus limiting the Court's potential effects.
Another question concerns the number or percentage of cases which come
before the highest court(s). A court's potential impact is limited to the extent
that relatively few cases reach it but are instead resolved elsewhere in the system.
Our tendency to engage in a "top-down" approach in studying the judicial sys-.
temr long left us unclear as to the lower courts' crucial role in framing issues and
disposing of an extremely high percentage of cases. While we recognized the
Supreme Court's rejection of most cases brought before it, we paid less attention
16 For example. F. WIRT, THE POLITICS OF SOUTHERN EQUALITY (1970); G. ORFIELD,
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT (1969); and E. LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL CHANGE: REVOLUTION WITHIN
THE JUVENILE COURT (1970).
17 For another discussion of some of these points, see Linde, Admonitory Functions of
Constitutional Courts: The United States Experience, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 415 (1972).
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to the (low) percentage of cases people started to bring up to the Supreme
Court. A "bottom-up" view allows us to see that most cases are screened out
on their way "up the line." Howard, examining litigation flow in three United
States Courts of Appeals, concluded that "district courts and agencies made
controlling decisions in the vast majority of litigated cases" and that Courts of
Appeals, "as courts of last resort in the overwhelming majority of cases . . .
make national law residually and regionally.""8 He found that only two percent
of nonconsolidated circuit decisions were reviewed by the Supreme Court, leav-
ing the Courts of Appeals as the final court in 98 percent of the cases. Although
Richardson and Vines had found some "issue-transformation" between the dis-
trict court and appellate court levels, with cases changing into civil liberties
cases at the higher level,'9 Howard found that district and circuit judges had
defined issues differently in only slightly more than 5 percent of the cases, making
the trial courts the ultimate issue-framers and deciders in almost all the cases.
The relation between the courts and other branches of the government is
another matter which needs to be pursued in any comparative perspective. That
the United States operates within the framework of a tripartite separation of
powers--in reality, the sharing of powers between three separate institutional
branches-is one of the main items differentiating it from other countries, which
instead operate under a parliamentary system. Dahl has argued that, with minor
exceptions, "the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national
alliance" and is seldom out of tune for long with law-making majorities.2" How-
ever, as Howard and Bushoven have asserted:
Contrary to .. . Dahl's argument ... that the Supreme Court can direct
the course of national policy only as part of dominant law-making coalitions,
the most aggressive uses of judicial power in the last decade have occurred
precisely where political processes were stalemated or atrophied.
2'
That the executive and legislative branches take different positions on policy
matters not only serves to protect the Supreme Court from intrusions by the
other branches, which might interfere more frequently if President and Congress
were more closely aligned,2 2 but also allows the Court more freedom of action.
It must be recognized that the Supreme Court is politically independent
and efficacious, capable of making policy and not merely resolving disputes. It
can move first causing the other branches to react. Its involvement can be "posi-
tive, general, and continual," rather than "negative, selective, and episodic."
2
1
18 J. Howard, "Litigation Flow in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C., 2nd and 5th
Circuits," at 6, 13; paper presented to the American Political Science Association, September,
1971. Published at 8 LAW & SocrnTy REv. 33 (1973).
19 Richardson and Vines, Review, Dissent and the Appellate Process: A Political Inter-
pretation, 29 J. PoLIrTcs 597 (1967).
20 R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 205-206 (1972). The original argument
was Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
6 J. Pun. L. 279 (1957).
21 Howard and Bushoven, The Screws Case Revisited, 29 J. PoLrITIs 617 (1967). For
additional criticism of DahI's position, see Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the
Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 790.
22 S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 269 (1969).
23 G. Schubert, "The Future of the Nixon Court," University Lecture, University of Hawaii,
May 9, 1972.
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In several areas, the Court acted largely alone for some time, for example, in
school desegregation from 1954-1955 (Brown v. Board of Education)24 until
1964-1965 (the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act), and in criminal procedure, from the early 1960's until the last
years of the decade, when the Omnibus Crime Control Act was written. There
is no question that later involvement of Congress and the executive branch makes
a difference in the law's impact. This is evident in school desegregation where
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare guidelines following the 1964
Civil Rights Act brought about more desegregation than had the Court. In the
public accommodations area the Court, which had avoided deciding the basic
constitutional issue concerning "sit-ins," was able merely to uphold Congressional
power to act after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. If the Court comes late
to an area, as it did with welfare, it may be able to have only an interstitial effect
as it threads its way through a maze of statutes and administrative regulations. 5
Closely related to the matter of the Court's relationship to other branches of
government is the question of whether the Court is a "self-starter" or only passive.
In legal theory the Supreme Court is basically a passive instrument not able to
call up cases for decision thus making its impact largely contingent upon the
nature of the inputs or stimuli others provide. Although justiciability standards
are somewhat flexible, the fact that the Court will deal only with matters raised
within the framework of an actual case or controversy, rather than taking any
case any government official might want it to decide, also limits its potential
impact.
Nevertheless there are at least three elements which interact to bring a wide
range of cases to the Supreme Court and to allow it, within the general con-
straints of its theoretical passivity, to be quite active. While the Court cannot
pick a case not tendered to it, many cases are tendered, in part because of the
American cultural phenomenon of transmuting social, economic, and political
issues into legal ones, thus making them available for selection by the Court in
the exercise of its discretion. Ambiguity in the language of opinions also leads
people to come back to the Court in the hope of obtaining further resolution
of issues. The stream of obscenity cases after the Court's initial attempt in the
Roth case2 ' to establish standards-a stream not yet over despite the spate of
rulings and the redefinition of 1973 2 7 -is an example. While the Court chose
not to hear cases brought back to it, as it did with most school desegregation
rulings after Brown II, this does not change the fact that it has the opportunity
to do so. A final element is that the Court can encourage potential litigants to
initiate cases or potential appellants to appeal by statements indicating which
issues are "not before the Court" or are "not being resolved at this time." While
such statements may be merely attempts at clarification, they can be (and are)
read as invitations to bring cases on as yet undecided matters.
28
24 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 '(1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
25 Wasby, An Era of Uncertainty: The Supreme Court and Welfare Policy, 30 PuB.
WELFARE 16 (1972).
26 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27 Particularly Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
28 For a discussion of this point, see S. WASB*, supra note 11 at 65-66.
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Viewing the Court as basically passive has deflected us from seeing the
Court's full power to choose its own agenda. The certiorari power, providing
the ability to pick and choose between cases without having to express a reason
for so doing, is certainly one crucial element differentiating the United States
Supreme Court from other constitutional courts. That the Court has turned its
theoretically mandatory appeals jurisdiction into a similarly discretionary juris-
diction reinforces the special quality of the Court's work. Although many con-
troversial matters are certainly not heard, such exercise of discretion helps to
insure that the Court does not deal only with minor errors but rather with ques-
tions of major (political) relevance. If the Court were forced, as are most
American state high courts, to hear all cases, the important ones would tend
to be submerged even if they were heard and decided. Thus under the present
system the impact in case X may be greater because case Y was not heard.
This effect of the Supreme Court's discretion on its ability to have an impact
gives substantial importance to the Court's strategies of choice. We thus need
to see whether by avoiding certain touchy issues, the Court is able to "keep its
powder dry" for more effective use later. For example, early avoidance of mis-
cegenation statutes and cemetery desegregation may have decreased friction
which could have made acceptance of Brown v. Board of Education even more
difficult to obtain.29 Similarly, the "self-inflicted wound" allegedly perpetrated
by the Warren Court was created not by merely being involved in controversial
issues but by being involved in so many of them. Thus, the Court's avoidance
behavior and the doctrines used in aid of such behavior, e.g., standing, "political
questions," and abstention, can be seen as important parts of the Court's reper-
toire in seeking to achieve compliance. So are the ways in which the Court deals
with cases it does decide, for example, its use of broad opinions rather than
narrow ones to resolve cases and its use of docket-management in the grouping
of cases for decision. That the Supreme Court's members are conscious of strategy
considerations can be determined from explicit considerations of impact voiced
by some Court members, for example, in the criminal procedure retroactivity
rulings in the 1960's."
III. Communication of Decisions
Another question which can be raised as we try to stimulate the comparative
examination of the impact of judicial decisions is how the actions of the courts
29 A. D'Amato, "Schools, Cemeteries and Mixed Marriages: The Supreme Court and
Strategies of Desegregation," paper presented to Midwest Political Science Association, April,
1968.
30 See S. WASBY, supra note 11 at 68-72 and more particularly G. Gregory Fahlund,
Retroactivity and the Warren Court: The Strategy of a Revolution, 35 J. POLITICS 570 (1973).
Direct evidence of the Court's use of strategy comes from the Justices themselves. For example,
Chief Justice Burger recently commented:
When Taylor v. Georgia was unanimously decided in 1942, Chief Justice Stone as-
signed the writing of the opinion to Justice Byrnes for the very sound reason that an
opinion by a leading figure from the South gave added force to a holding that the
Georgia statute violated federal prohibitions against peonage.
Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Mr. Justice James F.
Byrnes, 93 S. Ct. lxviii, lxxxv (1972). I am thankful to Carol Welch, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, for reinforcing the relevance of such comments for social scientists' study of the
Court's strategy.
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and their opinions explaining those actions are communicated to those affected
by the action. If we are to evaluate the low rates with which individuals follow
what the courts specify to be "the law," we need to know whether the rulings
of those courts are ever getting to those who might be expected to utilize them;
compliance cannot occur without information. This requires us to examine the
transmission of decisions, an aspect of the impact process which has not been
adequately studied. While Newland and Grey have extensively examined the
role of the media,2' relatively little other work has been done to date although
systematic study of the communication of Supreme Court decisions has now
begun, primarily in the area of criminal procedure, 2 on which we shall draw
for examples in the remainder of this article.
One way to begin development of a "communications approach" to the
study of judicial impact is to develop an inventory of means by which Supreme
Court decisions might reach their intended destination. After an examination of
some of those means, 3 we will move on to examine some social science theories
which are of potentially great usefulness in studying the communication of judi-
cial decisions and which can assist us in the process of examining such matters
in a comparative perspective.
The most obvious means by which Supreme Court decisions would be com-
municated would be the published opinions themselves, available in a number
of versions. These are not universally available. In many rural areas, copies are
simply not available at all; in Illinois, only about half the county seats have the
Supreme Court's opinions available, with far smaller percentages having the
opinions of the lower federal courts. Police departments, even in large cities, are
also not likely to have the opinions although the availability of the Bureau of
National Affairs' Criminal Law Reporter has changed that situation to some
extent.
The court system might be used to communicate decisions, but Supreme
Court rulings are usually transmitted only to the courts from which the cases
were brought and are not sent down through channels as we might expect to
occur in bureaucratically-structured organizations. Judges in other courts, with-
out time to read the cases, may not learn about the Supreme Court's opinions
unless the cases are cited by the lawyers handling cases in their courts. Thus, the
trial court, while it could be the key link in the process of transmitting criminal
procedure rulings to the police, may not actually serve that function. In addi-
tion, even when they know about the cases, trial judges may not communicate
them, for example, by simply sustaining or denying motions to suppress evidence
without explaining why the searches were proper or improper. Even criminal
trial judges favorably disposed toward the police may not wish to embarrass a
policeman by pointing out in open court how he erred. Even if the trial judge
31 Newland, Press Coverage of the United States Supreme Court, 17 WESTERN POL. Q.
15 (1964); D. GREY, THE SUPREmE COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1968).
32 The first major work was N. MILNER, sUpra note 5.
33 For a more extended discussion of this and related points, see Wasby, The Communi-
cation of the Supreme Court's Criminal Procedure Decisions: A Preliminary Mapping, 18
VILLA. L. RPv. 1086 (1973) and Getting the Message Across: Communicating Court Decisions
to the Police, 1 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 29 '(1974, forthcoming).
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were to explain a Supreme Court ruling and its application, the message often
would not get transmitted effectively to the police, because few departments
have their "court officer" report what has occurred. Communication, when it
occurs, is more likely to come from casual conversation between an officer who
may have happened to hear a judge's explanation and a few of his fellow-officers.
The lawyer may be a more important link in the communications process
than the formal court system. An opinion may move downward from court to
court only after first moving "outward" to lawyers who then bring it to the
judge's attention, sometimes misstating the law of the case and thus reinforcing
improper communication of what the Supreme Court has done. Lawyers who
are particularly important in the communication process are state attorneys gen-
eral and local prosecutors. (The F.B.I. also serves as a major channel of in-
formation about court cases through a regularly published bulletin.) State
attorneys general issue legal opinions and sometimes publish bulletins for law
enforcement officers in which Supreme Court decisions are interpreted and
related to state cases and statutes. In some states a contact person is also avail-
able in the attorney general's office to answer particularly difficult legal questions
on a daily basis. Only a few local prosecutors consider it their task to provide
regular information on court decisions to the police, may of whom believe they
should receive such assistance. This prosecutorial failure has led a number of
larger police departments to hire police legal advisors-full-time attorneys on
the police payroll who assist in policy development and interpret Supreme Court
rulings for the officers in the department.
Other sources of information include the media-radio, television, news-
papers-from which attentive law enforcement officers find out initially about
Supreme Court rulings, but only a very few newspapers print excerpts from
even the most important decisions, and their tendency is to report effects of
decisions rather than the Court's "message." Little use has yet been made of
educational television to help train police. Specialized publications are more
likely than media of general circulation to contain information relevant for the
police, but the contents of court decisions are only sporadically presented in
most of the police journals." Legal periodicals contain much discussion of cases,
but that discussion is addressed primarily to lawyers, not law enforcement officers,
and its utility is decreased by the fact it appears long after a decision has been
announced. Handbooks and manuals suffer from the same time lag but can be
effectively used in training programs.
Training programs are considered by the officers themselves to be the best
means of learning about Supreme Court decisions, but even the relatively low
minimum number of pre-recruit training hours is not always mandatory; therefore,
by no means are all officers reached. Even fewer officers are affected by in-
service training programs, necessary to "refresh" police officers' legal knowledge.
Both types of programs, and the increasing number of pre-service programs
offered primarily at junior colleges, also contain only a small proportion of
34 Wasby, From Supreme Court to Policeman: A Partial Inventory of Materials, 8 CRIM.
L. BULL. 587 (1972).
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material on Supreme Court criminal procedure rules, concentrating instead on
technical skills."
The instructors in training programs are another vital link in the trans-
mission of decisions to policemen; their continuing availability after seminars and
courses to provide answers to men trying to apply the knowledge they have just
learned would make the communication more effective generally; but there are
only a few "circuit-riding" trainers to provide such important follow-up, partic-
ularly to officers in departments not close to larger cities.
While inventories of mechanisms, like other classifications, are useful start-
ing devices, they are only a building block toward the development of theory,
not theory itself. Some communication theories developed by social scientists
with other interests than the impact of judicial decisions seem to have consider-
able usefulness for scholars of the judicial process. Those which seem particularly
useful are the two-step flow of communication, diffusion theory, and portions
of the theory of political development. Even when earlier findings from these
theories are found not to apply directly or precisely in other settings, the theories
are useful in organizing, analyzing, and understanding our data; their heuristic
value alone is thus sufficient to warrant discussing them.
Perhaps the best-known communications theory is Katz and Lazarsfeld's
"two-step flow of communication. 36 Prior to its development, it was widely
assumed that the impact of the mass media, at that time largely the newspapers,
was direct-that views were formed by what people read. Social psychology sug-
gested at least one defect in that view: people read selectively and filtered what
they read. Katz and Lazarsfeld added a social process to the media-recipient
relationship. They argued that an individual is exposed to various subjects and
ideas by the media, but that the media's effects on opinions are attenuated, with
opinions more likely to be affected by contact with other individuals, particularly
those called "opinion leaders," who pay more than average attention to the
media. They found influence with respect to opinions to flow from opinion
leader to average citizen, but it was the latter who usually initiated the contact,
approaching others he knew to be more knowledgeable.
Further refinement of the theory suggested that opinion leaders, while paying
more attention to the media than does the average citizen, are themselves influ-
enced more by other people than by the media. In a sense opinion leaders have
opinion leaders; one can posit several levels of such leaders similar to the several
levels through which a Supreme Court opinion must pass to reach the ultimate
recipient, a "multi-step flow." Opinion leaders not only influence opinions, but
also channel information, produce social pressure to conform., and provide social
support for the views people holdY7
The applicability of this middle-range theory of the transmission of Supreme
Court decisions appears clear although some particulars may vary. For example,
law enforcement officers hear about decisions from the media although
usually not in great detail; the media may merely make them aware that the
35 Wasby, Police Training and Criminal Procedure, 39 POLICE CHIEF 24 (October, 1972).
36 E. KATZ & P. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE "(1955).
37 Katz, The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on an Hy-
pothesis, 21 Pus. OPINION Q. 61 (1957).
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Supreme Court has ruled in a way which might affect their work. Certain
people in the "law enforcement community," including attorneys general, de-
fense attorneys, and editors of special bulletins, play the role of opinion leader
by devoting far more attention to what the Court is doing than does tie average
policeman although, unlike Katz and Lazarsfeld's opinion leaders, they may
be paid to do so. Unlike the citizens in the original two-step flow theory, who
usually initiated inquiry, the law enforcement specialists initiate communication;
in fact, the call for greater professional training of policemen is, in effect, a call
for the specialists to initiate more communication. Some police officers seek out
legal advice from prosecutors, and there is evidence that the effect of law enforce-
ment specialists on policemen will be greatest if the policemen want the training,
if they want to know what the Supreme Court has said, and if they want to
comply with it even if they have not initiated "search behavior" in the direction
of obtaining legal information.
Some research based on the Katz-Lazarsfeld model has led to the suggestion
that the two-step flow hypothesis might not apply to groups other than those on
which it was first tested, particularly in the case of foreign groups. For example,
Harik found that in a small Egyptian delta village:
The more people are exposed to the mass media, the more likely they are
to obtain political information directly [from the media] ... The role of
mediators [opinion leaders] in disseminating information may decline in
relation to the increase in exposure to the mass media.38
While mass media do not carry much information of direct relevance to the law
enforcement officer, making him more dependent on the "opinion leader," greater
emphasis on professionally-prepared specialized communications, like the Inter-
national Association of Chiefs of Police's (IAGP) "Training Keys," could easily
reduce the informal opinion leader's transmission role.
Somewhat related to the two-step flow of communication idea, but differing
notably in its emphasis, is "diffusion theory," associated with the name of Everett
Rogers, 9 in which attempts are made to explain how an innovation is adopted in
a particular population. For Rogers the basic elements in the diffusion process
are the innovation itself (for our purposes the Supreme Court ruling), the process
by which it is communicated, the social system, and the passage of time. Some
innovations are apparently adopted regardless of the decisions of others; that is,
the social system seems to have little effect. There are, however, others which
require that a majority of those in the social system accept the idea before indi-
viduals can adopt the innovation. With still other innovations, a group decision-
requiring all to adopt, even when unwilling-may be necessary before adoption.
At first blush it seems likely that Supreme Court decisions fall into the second
category-that there must be a broad acceptance of the idea of the decision
before many in a particular agency or jurisdiction will adopt it as part of their
daily routine.
38 Harik, Opinion Leaders and the Mass Media in Rural Egypt: A Reconsideration of
the Two-Step Flow of Communications Hypothesis. 65 Am. POL. SCI. RV. 731, 734 (1971).
39 E. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1962). I am indebted to Neal Milner, Uni-
versity of Hawaii, for suggesting Rogers' applicability to impact studies.
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Relevant findings from diffusion research include Menzel's report from a
study of physicians that those in isolation are not likely to defy existing standards
and that to be an (early) innovator one needs allies before long-established cus-
toms can be abandoned." Rogers had previously found that early adopters are
younger, of higher social status, in more specialized work, and have a "different
type of mental ability" than do later adopters. 1 They also have a tendency to
perceive themselves as deviant from others in the system. As these seemingly
contradictory findings may suggest, groups vary in the degree to which they
are open to innovation, with some having a norm of being "up-to-date." Such
a norm may mean that much organizational innovation, particularly in larger
or more successful organizations, is "slack" or not related to efficiency. As Mohr
has put it, "[a]fter solution of immediate problems, the quest for prestige rather
than the quest for organizational effectiveness or corporate profit motivates the
adoption of most new programs and technologies."42
In addition to these findings, we have some other propositions from diffusion
theory which are potentially applicable in our judicial impact work. For example,
Rogers' suggestions that "impersonal information sources are most important at
the awareness stage, and personal sources are most important at the evaluation
stage in the adoption process," and that "[c]osmopolite information sources are
most important at the awareness stage, and localite information sources are most
important at the evaluation stage."'" The process of transmitting Supreme Court
decisions to their ultimate user is more often started by the national press, the
wire services or the FBI, with the most effective ultimate communication to the
law enforcement officer being in local training sessions. Rogers also suggests that
those adopting innovations earlier will have relied more on impersonal and cos-
mopolite sources of information than will have later adopters.44 Those who first
begin to follow Supreme Court decisions in their work may well be operating
"on their own" before a network of local support--or local training programs,
for example-begins.
Those studying political development have been attracted to the role of
communication, which helps produce literacy and political awareness, and to the
shift in communications systems from "primitive" or undeveloped to more com-
plex and sophisticated stages. The development theorists have produced broader
concepts and perspectives which may help us to understand the process of com-
municating Supreme Court decisions. Two aspects of development theory which
are of particular interest to those wishing to study the communication of the
Supreme Court's decisions are the way in which communications systems differ
and the transmission of "modem" views and perspectives to those of "traditional"
orientation.
Pye suggests the existence of traditional, transitional, and modem communi-
cations systems. In a transitional system-the description of which appears
40 Menzel, Innovation, Integration, and Marginality: A Survey of Physicians, 25 Am.
SOrOLoGicAL RV. 704'(1960).
41 Rogers, supra note 39, at 192.
42 Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 Am. POL. Sci. Rv. 111, 126
(1969).
43 Rogers, supra note 39, at 99, 102.
44 Id., at 179.
1033
1NOTRE DAME LAWYER
particularly appropriate to American law enforcement agencies -there is a heavy
reliance upon "foreign and international systems of communication" (read:
external sources) for information, "but there are no ready criteria for selecting
what should be retransmitted" from the greatly increased volume of communi-
cations, resulting in random retransmission." There are, Pye says, few specialized
opinion leaders "capable of sifting the messages of the mass-media system and
drawing attention to matters of special interest to particular audiences." By
contrast, a modem system "is capable of transmitting a massive flow of uniform
messages ... ."" While we have seen the growth of some new methods of com-
munication to law enforcement officers, commenced either by private entrepre-
neurs or by public agencies operating with Law Enforcement Assistance Act
funds, there are few such media. This increases the relevance of Pye's observation
that:
Under ... conditions of relative sparcity of media it appears that people do
not develop the same attitudes of selectivity (common to modem systems),
and therefore in transitional societies the media can in fact play a far more
potent role in political education than in the saturated societies.47
Rogers' distinction between social systems with traditional norms and mod-
em social systems parallels and adds to this discussion. A modem social system
has many ideas entering the system from external sources because of high inter-
action between members of the system and outsiders, and there is a high value
on science and education. While some law enforcement personnel are coming
to place more emphasis on training and education, there is still substantial
resistance to it; and ideas do not enter law enforcement agencies from the out-
side in large numbers.
The transmission of new views and perspectives, not merely the development
of new transmission systems, is of considerable importance both to development
theorists and students of the impact of court decisions. If we define Supreme
Court criminal procedure decisions, based on what Herbert Packer has called
the Due Process Model, as "modem," we can see the relevance of transmitting
them to the police, whose actions-characterized by the Crime Control Model-
may be viewed heuristically as "traditional."4 If we are to communicate Su-
preme Court rulings to the police, we must be concerned with resocializing police
to a new set of values. In Pye's words, one must communicate "with people who
have already reached what they feel to be a mature understanding of politics
[read: police operations] but [which] is in fact an understanding relevant to a
traditional... world.... .,49
If communication of new ideas is to be successful, attention must be paid
to relating the new communications to what has gone before-to establishing
"at any particular moment the appropriate balance between a people's search
45 L. PYE, ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 162 (1966).
46 Id., at 161.
47 Pye, Communications and Civic Training in Transitional Societies in COMMUNICATIONS
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 126 (L. Pye ed. 1963).
48 H. PACKER, TirE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-238 (1968).
49 Pye, supra note 47, at 125.
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for innovation and their need for continuity" 5 -- and to transmitting the "modem
world" as not being extremely at odds with present views. Police need to be
informed how Supreme Court rulings fit into what they are doing and how such
rulings will not hinder what they perceive to be their primary task of enforcing
the laws and catching criminals. In short, it is crucial "whether the modem
world has been communicated as being friendly and sympathetic or hostile and
foreign, as being benign and comforting or harsh and intractible."51 If the latter
is accomplished, then perhaps we will be able to produce more law enforcement
officers of the type Susan White calls "rule-appliers," who allow themselves to be
controlled "'by the book' not so much because the book is right but because their
task is made easier as a result."
52
From the work of development theorists, we can obtain still more ideas
relevant to the explanation of the communication of decisions. For example, we
noted earlier that newly communicated rules may not be carried out because of
the recipients' "work situation." Seidman, examining the relationship between
law and development, has pointed out that "many role occupants may be
expected to be deviantly motivated with respect to the norms of development
because their reference groups adhere to contradictory norms." He also suggests
that "[a] norm of development may be expected to be dysfunctional because
it is not capable of performance under existing physical conditions."53 Perhaps
because the norm was not well communicated, it is seen as one which cannot be
carried out.
The idea of a patron-client relationship, used by some development theo-
rists,54 helps to put in perspective the relationship between a police chief and his
officers, an important organizational variable affecting communication. In
development theory, the local leader is quite important in bringing about accept-
ance of new ("external," "foreign," or "national" as opposed to "local") per-
spectives. While Supreme Court decisions do not reach policemen solely through
their chiefs, who thus do not control communication from the national level,
the chiefs can play a crucial role in the process. While newly-trained law enforce-
ment officers may have a more "modem" orientation, the transition must occur
under the aegis of many "traditional" chiefs. That "the conditions of rapid social
change ... probably intensified the clients' need for something or somebody to
depend on" reinforces the chief's authority.55 Because some chiefs insist on a
high degree of personal (as well as departmental) loyalty, the relationships be-
tween chief and officers in some departments, particularly those without the merit
system or career service, may be usefully viewed as patron-client relationships.
Thus policemen who want more training may find that a traditionally-oriented
50 Pye, Communications Policies in Development Programs, in COMMUNICATIONS AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 231 (L. Pye ed. 1963).
51 Pye, Introduction, in COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 4 (L. Pye ed.
1963).
52 White, A Perspective on Police Professionalism, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 61, 77 (1972).
53 Seidman, Law and Development: A General Model, 6 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 311, 326-27
(1972).
54 Scott, Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia, 66 Ase. POL. SCi.
REv. 91 (1972), is perhaps the most useful.
55 Lemarchand, Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Soli-
darities in Nation-Building, 66 AM. POL. Sc!. REV. 68 at 77 (1972).
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chief tied to a local power structure may block their way or at least increase the
risks of attempting to become better trained. On the other hand, if the police
chief, even though not "professional" in the sense of operating impersonally, is
attracted to new external law, he can legitimize this new orientation for his men.
Nevertheless, we must be aware that "there may be limits to how far traditional
patterns can be relied upon to accelerate processes of modernization," 6 and must
be extremely cautious not to push too far the application of the patron-client idea
to the police chief-police officer situation. As Scott points out, reciprocity "distin-
guishes patron-client dyads from relationships of pure coercion or formal author-
ity that also may link individuals of different status."5  Further, for Scott,
"[c]lients have particularistic goals which depend on their personal ties to the
leader," instead of the "common goals that derive from shared characteristics"
of "categorical group members," of whom police may be an example. 8 In
many police departments, particularly in large cities, clearly "formal authority"
of "explicit, impersonal-contract bonds"59 characterizes relationships. However,
in the many small departments-a majority of all police departments in the
United States--such relationships do not exist and the relationship is more like
the "diffuse, 'whole-person' relationship"60 which characterizes patron-client ties.
IV. Conclusion
This article first attempted to present a very brief history of the de-
velopment of studies of the impact of the United States Supreme Court and to
indicate some of the aspects of the American judicial system which would affect
or limit the findings from these studies when utilized in comparative analysis.
It then turned to a more extended examination of the uses of a communications
framework for such study, indicating some of the means by which Supreme Court
decisions might be communicated and finally explored some social science com-
munication theories which might be of use, indicating examples of their appli-
cation in the area of law enforcement and criminal procedure.
56 Id., at 88.
57 Scott, supra note 54. at 93.
58 Id., at 97.
59 Id., at 95.
60 Id.
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